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LIBERAL THEORY AS A TOOL OF COLONIALISM AND
THE FORCED ASSIMILATION OF THE FIRST NATIONS
OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
JERRY WETZEV

Between 1869 and 1985, the Indian Act presumed that once the Mi'kmaq
of Nova Scotia could be christianised and civilised, they would voluntarily
embrace enftanchisement. By 1949, almost no Mi'kmaq had volunteered. A
Parliamentary review of the Indian Act concluded that voluntary enftanchisement as a policy of assimilation was not working. In 1949, when
Newfoundland's confederation with Canada was negotiated, federal officials
refased to assume their constitutional obligations to the Mi'kmaq, and other
First Nations, in Newfoundland and Labrador, by not recognising them as
Aboriginal peoples pursuant to the Indian Act. What the Indian Act had
failed to accomplish in respect to assimilating Mi'kmaq people in Nova Scotia
with their consent, federal officials attempted to make happen in
Newfoundland and Labrador by their unilateral use of Liberal democratic
theory. Federal officials asserted that because the Mi'kmaq and other First
Nations peoples in Newfoundland and Labrador had been de-Indianized by
their contact with white colonial society and because they had a theoretical
right to vote, they could not be considered as Indians under the Indian Act.
Federal officials applied a policy of "forced" enftanchisement for the first time
in Canadian history to the Mi'kmaq and other First Nations peoples in
Newfoundland and Labrador in 1965. This policy is still in force today in
Newfoundland and Labrador.
Entre 1869 et 1985, la Loi sur les indiens supposa qu 'apres avoir ete
«civilisi» et «chretienisi» le peuple Mi'kmaq de la Nouvelle-Ecosse
accepterait le droit de vote. ]usqu'a 1949, aucun Mi'kmaq se presenta
comme volontaire. Une etude parlementaire de la Loi sur les indiens conclut
que la politique d'octroyer le droit de vote aux volontaires ne marchait pas
comme strategie d'assimilation. En 1949, lorsque la confederation de la
Terre-Neuve avec le Canada fut negociee, !es fonctionnaires ftderaux
refuserent d'assumer leurs obligations constitutionnelles envers le peuple
Mi'kmaq et !es autres Premieres Nations en Terre-Neuve et au Labrador en
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ne leur reconnaissant pas comme un peuple autochtone selon la Loi sur les
indiens. Les Jonctionnaires ftderaux voulurent faire en Terre-Neuve et au
Labrador en utilisant unilateralement la theorie liberale de la democratie ce
que la Loi sur les indiens ne put pas faire en Nouvelle-Ecosse. Les
fonctionnares ftdiraux pretendirent que le peuple Mi'kmaq et les autres
Premieres Nations en Terre Neuve et au Labrador n' aient pas pu etre
considere comme des lndiens selon la Loi sur les indiens parce que ces peuples
aient perdu leur identite «indien» a cause de leur contact avec la societe
blanche colonisatrice et a cause de leur droit de vote theorique. Les
Jonctionnaires ftderaux mirent en place une politique d'octroiement «farce»
de droit de vote pour la premiere fois dans l'histoire canadienne envers le
peuple Mi'kmaq et des autres Premieres Nations en Terre-Neuve et au
Labrador. Cette politique est encore en force aujourd'hui.
Whenever legislators endeavour to take away and destroy
the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery
under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of
war with the people who are thereupon absolved from
any further obedience ....
John Locke, 1690

In 1949, Newfoundland confederated with Canada becoming the
tenth province. The internal political process among
Newfoundlanders in debating and voting on the kind of government they wanted exemplifies the basic concepts of Liberal democratic social contract theory. The process that took place in
Newfoundland leading up to confederation illustrates the cultural
values and norms British subjects in Newfoundland believed in,
such as: formal equality-where everyone is entitled to an opinion
and a vote; consensual, informed voluntary choice-where information is available (in theory since many were illiterate) in print or
by speeches so that everyone could make his or her own informed
choice; liberty-where each individual exercises their personal liberty in voting for the kind of government they wanted.
Kathleen Mahoney has summarized the basic principles of liberal theory that are the philosophical foundation of AngloCanadian society in The Limits of Liberalism. 1 Mahoney sees
Canadian political and jurisprudential thought evolving from John
1

K. Mahoney, "The Limits of Liberalism" in R. F. Devlin, Canadian

Perspectives On Legal Theory (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 1991).
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Locke, John Stewart Mill and other liberal theorists. Five general
principles arise from this philosophy:
Because all human beings are equal, there is no justification for any person or class of persons to exercise selfrealization more than any other.
... because each person has the right to pursue his or her
own version of happiness, ... no one else has a prior claim
on any other person's activities .... It is wrong for the
state to interfere with the conduct of the lives of adults as
long as they are not harming others. Political freedom is
a further liberal value because it operationalizes abstract
individualism and individual liberty by allowing individuals to decide best for themselves their own development
and self-determination by choosing who will govern
them. Each person must have the right to consent to a
government or reject it if it threatens individual rights
because freedom from arbitrary authority is essential to
the individual pursuit of happiness. The purpose of
democratic government is not to lead humanity to a
higher moral purpose, but rather to preserve life, liberty
and property. 2

In his analysis of how Aboriginal rights have been conceptualized in
Western legal thought, Jam es Youngblood Henderson looks at how
these Liberal principles influenced First Nation-British interaction.
Henderson's work looks at Mi'kmaq-British interaction in Nova
Scotia from the colonial period to 1985. 3 His work provides a
comparative basis for examining the development of Federal and
Provincial policy applied by Anglo-immigrants to the Mi'kmaq
Nation in Nova Scotia and the Mi'kmaq, Innu and Inuit Nations in
Newfoundland and Labrador in their on-going colonization of
these areas. This paper will focus on the negotiations that took place
between Anglo-immigrants to include Newfoundland as a Province
of Canada. The jurisprudence of confederation, specifically that
portion revealing how the Federal and Newfoundland
Governments wished to deal with the First Nations in

2

Ibid at 61.

J. Y. Henderson, "The Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights in the Western Legal
Tradition" in M. Boldt & ]. A. Long, The Quest For justice (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1985) at 185.
3
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Newfoundland and Labrador, will be analyzed with respect to its
reflection of general principles of Liberal philosophy.
Were these general principles extended to First Nations on the
basis of substantive equality, or were they applied to them in a unilateral manner that only reflected the preservation of Anglo-immigrant interests?
My analysis will attempt to illustrate the points at which the
general principles of liberal philosophy and Canadian law could
have been used to provide an opportunity for First Nations in
Newfoundland-Labrador to introduce their own terms of union,
but were not. Instead, the evidence will demonstrate that a pretentious policy of forced assimilation was applied to First Nations in
Newfoundland-Labrador by the Federal Government based on underlying assumptions of racial and cultural superiority couched in
the liberal language of "formal equality." That is, First Nations
peoples were "declared" to be equal within white Anglo-immigrant
.culture. This assimilative equality was used to obscure the different
rights Aboriginal peoples possessed.
The British and Canadian Crowns had initially recognized that
First Nations were nations of peoples with legal rights and interests
outside the jurisdiction of the Crown in the Royal Proclamation of
1763. The declaration of equality, however, was used by Federal
officials to silence all questions concerning any need to investigate
cultural and political differences between First Nations and the settler governments. This new policy departed from the legal requirement, which the British and Canadian Crowns had previously followed, that directed them to make agreements with First Nations.
The assimilative policy of deemed formal equality breached
Canadian constitutional law in order to oppress the political rights
of First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador. Moreover, this policy
denied First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador the benefit of the
Liberal-democratic ideology of free and voluntary choice to determine their relationship with Canada. Further, the declaratory
policy of formal equality insured that First Nations people had no
legal identity as Aboriginal people with Aboriginal rights that could
be protected by the general principles of British common law. This
policy enabled the Federal and Newfoundland Governments to
confiscate First Nations territorial property while avoiding the legal
duty of entering into consensual treaties of sale and compensation.
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I. THE APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF COMMON LAW

James Youngblood Henderson has reviewed the recognition of
Aboriginal Rights in Western jurisprudence. Henderson attributes
the evolution of four general principles of English law as being influenced by the liberal social contract philosophy of John Locke. 4
His explanation for the evolution of the modern democratic state is
consistent with the five principles Mahoney derives from Liberal
philosophy. Henderson reduces Mahoney' s five principles of Liberal
philosophy to two principles, the principles of order and freedom:
Public laws were necessitated by the enmity of peoples
competing for scarce resources and reinforced by the
need for collaboration that marks social existence. Public
rules placed limits on the pursuit of private ends, thereby
ensuring that natural egoism and desires would not turn
society into a free-for-all in which everyone and everything was endangered. This was called the principle of
order. Public laws also facilitated mutual collaboration by
granting the power to individuals to choose the ends and
means of their striving without interfering with the striving of others. This was called the principle of freedom. 5
The need for order and freedom led to the evolution of democratic
government and the development of four general principles of
common law, structuring relations between individuals and between
individuals and the state. These principles are identified by
Henderson as the legal principles of tort, restitution, contract, and
property law. He defines these as:
The tort principle holds that one who causes harm
wrongfully should put the victim in as good a position as
he would have been in had no harm [occurred] .... The
restitution principle holds that when one person has been
enriched unjustifiably at another's expense, the benefit
should be restored [to the victim] based on the extent of
the benefit to the person and not the extent of the harm
inflicted .... The contract principle holds that persons
should keep their promises, and if they do not, the law
should place the deceived beneficiaries of a promise in
4

5

Ibid.
Ibid.

at 196.
at 185.
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the position they would have been in had the promises
been kept. The property principle defines the relationship
that exists between animate persons and inanimate things
and then applies the contract principle. 6

Henderson traces the historical development of the recognition
of Aboriginal rights from the Papal edicts of the 1500s that were
founded on the jurisprudence of Francis de Vitoria and
Bartholomew de Las Casas. These Spanish jurists wrote that the
"Indians" of the New World were human beings equal to
Europeans whose rights and title to property should be respected,
whether they were Christian or not. The thinking of Vitoria and
Las Casas was based on the European conception of natural law and
the underlying universal principles God had designed for mankind.7
Later, European jurists, such as Gentilis, Grotius and Pufendorf,
expounded on Vitoria's earlier writings, further developing and
incorporating these ideas into the law of nations.
English jurists, however, were intellectually unprepared for incorporating the New World reality of independent Aboriginal
Nations into English common law which had been, up to the discovery of the New World, inward looking:
Struggling to develop a national law and preoccupied
with the issue of where sovereignty resided within
England, the common [law] lawyers had little interest in
the law of nations and no theory or doctrines of law.
Instead, they believed in the history and experience of
the ancient procedures and formulas of the common law.
The common lawyers believed all political questions
could be solved by reducing them to legal questions and
deciding them on the basis of precedent. 8

6

Ibid. at 186. Although it is not completely clear what Henderson meant with
respect to the operation of the property principle, I am assuming he meant that
when a promise is made to a party concerning the protection or disposition of their
property it must be kept. Prior to his definition of the property principle he stated:
"The contract and property principles permit persons to make use of protected
rights and advantages by enforcing voluntary dispositions benveen and across
private spheres" (ibid. at 186).
7 Ibid. at 188-89. See F. Vitoria, De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectionnes (1597)
trans. J.P. Bate (1917); F. A. MacNutt, Bartholomew de Las Casas: His Life, His
Apostolate, and His Writings (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1909).
8 Henderson, ibid. at 191.
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One of the initial English effons to deal with the concept of legal jurisdiction over English settlements outside the territory of
England was the decision of Sir Edward Coke in 1607. Henderson
regards this decision as a summary of "fragmented medieval
thoughts of the common law, which regulated private disputes
among British subjects in newly acquired territories." 9 Henderson
summarizes the essential elements of Lord Coke's decision:
if the inhabitants of a country conquered or purchased by
England were civilized, their existing laws remained in
force until altered by the sovereign or, after the
Restoration, by Parliament. If they were savages or pagans it was presumed they had no law, and English law
filled the vacuum at once. If the country was uninhabited
'desert', Englishmen going abroad to occupy it took their
law with them 'as their birthright'. 10

Henderson suggests that these principles evolved into three common law principles that vested the existing rights of First Nations in
the evolving British law of nations. The Contractual Principle of
Discovery,
was a limited right in international law. It gave a jurisdictional right to trade or to seek a voluntary disposition of
existing rights and tenure from American nations .... By
analogy and precedent, the common lawyers understood
discovery to assert a 'perfectible entitlement' or 'preemptive' right. 11

Such a pre-emptive right is consistent with the principle of free
voluntary consent. I would suggest that this principle also demonstrates that Anglo-immigrants attributed Liberal individual "rights"
to First Nations people, at this time recognizing a substantive
equality and not an assimilative equality. In other words, First
Nations were accorded the right to self-determination in trading
with Anglo-immigrants. This is not to say that First Nations people
were motivated by the same values and cultural norms as AngloEuro-immigrants, but only that the immigrants projected their own
Euro-centric conceptions of individual interests onto their dealings
with First Nations peoples.
Ibid
Ibid.
11 Ibid. at 192-93.

9

JO
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Trading was done at the individual to individual level. When
real estate became part of the trade between Europeans and First
Nations a second principle evolved, The Proprietary Principle of
Purchase:
Almost from the beginning of colonial expansion, British
colonial governors in the New World had clear instructions to respect native land rights and to acquire territory
only by purchase or treaty of purchase .... The proprietary principle of purchase flourished among the British
colonists in North America. By 1683, the New England
Puritans considered that it was far more important to
hold the land under a tribal deed by 'fair contract or just
conquest' than under English law. 12

Here, a purchase of land from a First Nation, or First Nation's person, was seen as being a superior tenure to an English Crown grant
(if the surrender of First Nations title was not obtained).
Henderson notes that in 1683, "the Lords of Trade instructed
their commissioners to confirm all titles held under tribal deeds in
Massachusetts." 13 First Nations were regarded as having sovereignty
over their lands and the Liberal right to freely determine the
disposition of their properties. This demonstrates that in the early
colonial period English colonists recognized First Nations as
possessing political rights equal to the English on two distinct levels:
the individual to individual level and the nation to nation level,
where each nation was accorded rights similar to individuals.
Henderson sees this latter relationship further defined in a third
common law principle, John Locke's Contractual Principle of
Treaty Commonwealth:
Native Governments of America were characterized by
Locke as independent states under 'kings' or 'rulers'.
Under this theo1y of the social contract, 'those who have
the supreme power of making laws in England, France, or
Holland are to the Indian but like the rest of the world12

Ibid. at" 193-94. Henderson is citing the Instructions to Captain Endecott in F.
Jennings, The Invasion ofAmerica: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975) at 135. Henderson
previously noted that the English term "conquest" did not mean militarily
conquered. In English feudal law "conquest" meant purchase. His authority for this
comes from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland at 1029-32.
13 Henderson, ibid. at 194.
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men without authority. This doctrine did not preclude
American nations from entering into treaties with other
European governments in order to create a more stable
political environment, and it did not preclude England
from entering into treaties in order to secure property
rights from the natives. Locke called this 'treaty commonwealth' or 'treaty federalism' .... Treaty commonwealth was considered by Locke to be distinct from domestic consensual government. The major distinction between the two was that the former was a contractual alliance in the law of nations and hence was not a comprehensive subordination of will. l4

The "social contract" between the British Crown and a First Nation
would be limited to the specific purposes expressed in the treaty.
Henderson contends that Locke saw the need to develop a direct
treaty commonwealth between the British Crown and First Nations
in order to avoid the assimilation of British subjects in the jurisdiction of First Nation governments. If the Crown allowed colonies, or
individual British subjects, to purchase lands directly from First
Nations these purchases placed the purchasers under the jurisdiction
of the sellor First Nation's government, according to Locke's
Liberal theoretical principle of tacit consent. This theory is derived
from Locke's view that an individual should have the right to chose
who will govern him or her.
The theory of tacit consent explains how a non-consenting individual "tacitly" becomes subject to the laws of a government to
which they never consented. For instance, this can happen by birth,
land purchases or ones physical presence in a foreign jurisdiction. A
purchase of land from a First Nation was free of any duty to the
British Crown and placed the purchaser beyond the Crown's jurisdiction:
Direct treaties between the crown and American nations
were the sole cure for the mischief of the prior purchases
of native lands. A prohibition against purchases by governors and· subjects without expressed authority of the
crown would resolve this problem in the future. l5

This problem was highlighted in the Royal Instructions of 1761.
14 Ibid. at
15 Ibid at

196.
197.
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In 1761, there had been numerous up-risings by Atlantic First
Nations as English settlers intruded into lands reserved for First
Nations under prerogative treaties with the Crown in New England
and Nova Scotia. First Nations expressed their dissatisfaction both
in action and representations to the British Crown's officials. His
Majesty reacted by issuing the Royal Instructions of 1761 to address
these grievances. This Proclamation was sent to Governor Belcher
for implementation in Nova Scotia. In the Proclamation:
... His Majesty acknowledged 'the fatal Effects which
would attend a discontent amongst the Indians in the
present situation of affairs' and asserted His Royal
Determination 'upon all occasions to support and protect
the said Indians in their Just Rights and Possessions and
to keep inviolable the Treaties and Compacts which have
been entered into with them'. More specifically, the
Proclamation forbade the passing of any grants in any
territories reserved to the Indians by treaty, and required
the removal of all persons who had settled on the reserved
lands. 16

When Governor Belcher of Nova Scotia implemented these instructions by issuing a Proclamation reserving all the lands and
coasts from the Muskquodobit River to the Bay of Chaleur, based
on the long possession of this area by the Mi'kmaq, he was overruled by the Lords of Trade.17 The inconsistency between the directions to Governor Belcher in the Royal Instructions of 1761,
Belcher' s faithful implementation of these directions, and the Lords
of Trade's position, raises the question of dishonourable behaviour
by the Crown. The 1761 Instruction was incorporated in a stricter
and more comprehensive document, the Royal Proclamation of
1763.
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 forbade the purchase of Indian
lands except by the Crown. I would suggest that it incorporates
Henderson's three common law principles of discovery, purchase
and treaty commonwealth:
the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We
are connected, and who live under our Protection, [the
16 D. Johnston, The Taking of Indian Lands In Canada: Consent Or Coercion?
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre, 1989) at 10-11.
17 Ibid. at 12.
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Discovery principle] should not be molested or disturbed
in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and
Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by
Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their
Hunting Grounds .... And whereas great Frauds and
Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the
Indians, ... [the purchase principle] and to the End that
the Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of
Discontent, We do, with the Advice of our Privy Council
strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do
presume to make any Purchase from the said Indians of
any Lands reserved to the said Indians, within those parts
of our Colonies where, We have thought proper to allow
Settlement; but that if, at any Time any of Said Indians
should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same
shall be purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some
public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be
held for that purpose by the Governor or Commander in
Chief of Our Colony respectively within which they shall
lie ... [the treaty principle] .1s

Thus, the First Nations were seen as dependent domestic nations
within the "Dominions or Territories" which the Crown claimed,
but were still accorded the power to determine the relationship they
would have with the Crown through treaties.
None of the terms or directions in the Royal Proclamation of
1763 suggest that the Crown claimed any right to interfere with the
internal political organization of First Nations. In fact, there was
implicit recognition of the consensual form of government conducted by First Nations in the process by which agents of the
Crown could purchase First Nations' lands. That is: "but that if, at
any Time, any of said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the
said Lands, the same shall be purchased only for Us, in Our Name,
at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians." This prerogative law evolved into a Treaty process in the 19th century that
included not only the purchase of land, but the kind of relationship
First Nations citizens would have with the Crown. 19
R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1.
In St. Catharines Milling & Lumberv. R. [1887) 13 S.C.R. 577, Strong]., in
interpreting the status and effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 at 602-38, but
particularly at 628-29, said it was the same as an Act of Parliament. Gwynn J.
18

l9
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Treaties of protection followed, enhancing the Treaty
Commonwealth structure. This structure was repeatedly recognized
in Privy Council decisions in North America, 20 in numerous other
countries occupied by England21 and in the United States. 2 2 The
treaties of Peace and Friendship the British negotiated with the
Mi'kmaq explicitly recognized that the Mi'kmaq, as a nation of
people, had a right to chose how they would pursue their own cultural vision of happiness within an accommodative relationship with
the British Crown as a "protector." The treaties promised the application of the general principles of British law to protect their rights
and properties in settling any disputes that might arise between
Mi'kmaq and Anglo-immigrants. 23

referred to it as the "Indian Bill of Rights" (ibid. 674). Strong and Gwynn JJ.'s
interpretation of the Royal Proclamation was upheld by the House of Lords (1888)
14 AC. 46 (P.C.) at 54.
20 Henderson, supra note 3 at 198, Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut, in J.H.
Smith, Appeals To The Privy Council From The American Plantations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1950) at 425.
21 Henderson, ibid. at 198-203.
22 Ibid. at 200. United States v. Mitchell, (1835) 9 Peters 711 (S.C.).
2 3 The Treaty of 1726 promised:
That the Indians shall not be molested in their persons, Hunting,
Fishing and Planting Grounds nor in any other of their lawful
Occasions by His Majesty's subjects or their Dependents ... That
if any of the Indians are Injured by any of His Majesty's aforesaid
Subjects or their Dependents they shall have Satisfaction and
Reparation made to them according to His Majesty's Laws
whereof the Indians shall have the Benefit Equall with His
Majesty's other subjects.
The Treaty of 1752 declared:
It is agreed that the Articles of Submission and Agreements made
at Boston in New England by the Delegates of the Penobscot
Norridgwolk & St. John's Indians in the year 1725 Ratifyed and
Confirmed by all the Nova Scotia Tribes at Annapolis Royale in
the month of] une 1726 ... shall be and are hereby from this time
forward renewed, reiterated and forever Confirmed ... Article
8-That all disputes whatsoever that may happen to arise
between the Indians now at Peace and others His Majesty's
subjects in this Province shall be tryed in His Majesty's Courts of
Civil Judicature, where the Indians shall have the same
advantages & Privileges as any others of His Majesty's Subjects.
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In other countries the British colonized, such treaties eventually
evolved into the founding of independent countries by the indigenous peoples. This historical evolution did not materialize in
Canada, however, where indigenous self-government has been oppressed. Other previous British colonies where the self-determination and political evolution of indigenous peoples have been oppressed by the Anglo-immigrants include the United States,
Australia, Hawaii and, until recently, New Zealand and South
Africa.
Prior to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the leaders of the
Mi'kmaq nation had entered into treaties of peace, protection,
friendship and trade with the British Crown. The first treaty was
signed in 1726, followed by British treaty violations and the renewal of warfare between the Crown and the Mi'kmaq nation. In
1752 another treaty was signed renewing all of the articles of the
1726 treaty and adding additional British commitments, such as
gift giving, to the Mi'kmaq at annual renewals of the treaty. Again
the British violated the treaty of 1752 before all of the Mi'kmaq
district Chiefs could consult and decide if they would ratify it.
Warfare between the British and the Mi'kmaq erupted once again.
In 1760 and 1761 treaties were signed between the Mi'kmaq Chiefs
of all the Mi'kmaq districts in what is now Nova Scotia and
Newfoundland. The Mi'kmaq viewed these treaties as renewals and
adhesions to the 1752 treaty compact.
The Canadian Crown now claims the 1760-61 adhesions were
new treaties that made the 1752 treaty compact void. These issues
are now being raised in the current case of R. v. Marshall. 24
However, the territory in question in the Marshall case is Nova
Scotia. The Grand Council of the Mi'kmaq and the Mi'kmaq
throughout Mi'kma'ki (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, PEI, Gaspe,
Newfoundland and the gulf islands) view the 1752 treaty and
1760-61 adhesions as covering all of Mi'kma'ki. 25
The Atlantic colonial governments disregarded the treaties, the
directions in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and from a Mi'kmaq
24

R. v. Marshall. This case is being argued now. The Federal Crown has charged
Donald Marshall Jr. with illegal commercial fishing. Donald Marshall contends
that he was fishing for eels pursuant to his treaty rights under the 1752 treaty
compact between the British Crown and the Mi'kmaq Nation.
25 For the purposes of this paper I only want to make the reader aware of the
treaties as a live legal issue.
..
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point of view, over-ran the Mi'kmaq homelands in Nova Scotia violating the treaties and the Crown's prerogative law. Instead of protecting the reserved territories of the Mi'kmaq, the Atlantic colonial
governments, with the exception of Newfoundland until 1832,
granted and/or leased Mi'kmaq lands to Anglo or Euro-immigrants
without legal authority. The Anglo-immigrant governments reserved small pieces of Mi'kmaq lands for the Mi'kmaq and encouraged them to gather at these spots so that the rest of the land
would appear to be vacant and could be occupied by Anglo-Euroimmigrant squatters. The Atlantic colonial governments then confirmed the illegal taking of lands reserved to the Mi'kmaq by providing the squatters with grants or leases:
In their path to representative, then responsible, government the colonial settlers in Atlantic Canada ignored the
prerogative treaties, instructions and proclamations. Their
goal was to have the same relationship with the Crown
that the First Nations enjoyed. Through various devices,
the colonial authorities replaced the prerogative order
with one based on their own self-interest. When the
crown refused to justify their instrumental order, the
colonials transformed colonialism and racism into local
legislative power, creating an alternative order that was
valid only within British settlements. The colonial order
allowed the immigrants to take the land and rights the
crown had reserved for the Indian nations and tribes. 26

Thus, the local colonial assemblies denied the aboriginal and treaty
rights of the Mi'kmaq. Mi'kmaq people had to petition the immigrants' government as if they too were immigrants in order to get a
license of occupation or a grant to occupy land in their own homeland.
In 1783, the colonial government of Nova Scotia attempted to
dispose of any responsibility for the Mi'kmaq by making ten grants
to Mi'kmaq groups along the rivers or bays they occupied. These
were never surveyed and Anglo-immigrants soon encroached upon
these lands, dispossessing the Mi'kmaq. 27

26 ]. Y. Henderson & A. Tanner., "Aboriginal Land Claims In The Atlantic
Provinces, in Aboriginal Land Claims In Canada: A Regional Perspective (Toronto:
Clark Copp Pitman, 1992) at 132-33.
27 Johnston, supra note 16 at 13.
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In 1820, Lt. Governor Dalhousie initiated a plan to develop a
comprehensive reserve system. The Province was divided into 10
regions with a one thousand acre reserve in each region. This plan
also failed. The reserves were never surveyed, Anglo-immigrants
again squatted on them and the government refused to remove the
squatters. Another plan was enacted by legislation in 1842 called An
Act to provide for the Instruction and Permanent Settlement of the
lndians. 28 For the first time a government official was appointed to
supervise and manage all lands reserved for the Mi'kmaq people.
He was also to protect the land from non-Mi'kmaq squatters. 29 The
various Nova Scotia Commissioners of Indian Affairs did little to
dislodge the squatters, however. In 1866, shortly before confederation, Nova Scotia Indian Commissioner Fairbanks, in his final
report, estimated that there were between 1400-1800 Mi'kmaq in
the entire province and that 20,730 acres ofland had been set aside
as reserves, although this figure did not account for the reserve
lands that were being squatted on by Anglo-immigrants. 30
It is important to note that up to this point neither the Imperial
Government nor the Government of Nova Scotia attempted to
legislatively interfere in the internal self-government of the
Mi'kmaq people in Nova Scotia. This would drastically change under the Government of Canada and the Indian Act.
The English colonial period in Nova Scotia appears to have been
a time when the assimilation of the Mi'kmaq was not an explicit
part of government policy. The colonial government had no organized plan to transform the Mi'kmaq into farmers, or engage them
in other Anglo vocations. Rather, the actions of the Nova Scotia
Government suggest that what it wanted to do was curtail the seasonal pattern of movement between different resource areas that the
Mi'kmaq people used. The setting aside of reserves was supposed to
settle the Mi'kmaq and remove the possibility of confrontations
with Anglo-immigrants who were exploiting Mi'kmaq resources.
The de-construction of the social and political structure of the
Mi'kmaq by the colonial government was not an explicit government policy. However, this is not to say that Mi'kmaq society had
not been changed by the efforts of the missionaries over the years.
Mi'kmaq values were mixed with Catholic beliefs. Still, the Grand
28
29
30

S.N.S. 1842, c. 16.
Johnstone, supra note 16 at 14.
Ibid. at 17.
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Council of the Mi'kmaq continued to function along side the traditional extended family order that dictated internal relations and
when and where the family would move on their seasonal rounds.
Thus, up to the time of confederation, the Colonial
Government of Nova Scotia did not want to assimilate the
Mi'kmaq as formal equals. The settlers' government used its legal
powers to push the Mi'kmaq out of the way while it usurped reserved Mi'kmaq lands. Once the Mi'kmaq were no longer a military threat to the English, the promises of protection under English
law, with the built in philosophy of individual rights, and the implicit recognition of substantive equality in His Majesty's court, fell
by the way side.
II. NOVA SCOTIA'S CONFEDERATION WITH
CANADA AND THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIAN
ACTTO THE MI'KMAQ OF NOVA SCOTIA
While colonial legislation was sparse and directed at the establishment of reserves in the Atlantic colonies, some legislation directly
interfering in the internal workings of First Nations had been
passed in Upper and Lower Canada by the Imperial administration.
England had administered Indian Affairs until 1860 in Upper and
Lower Canada. The British administrators had decided that since
the Indians were no longer needed as British allies against American
expansionism the best idea would be to "civilize" them by encouraging them to accept British culture. Thus began the British policy
of assimilation.31
In 1857, the Act to Encourage the gradual Civilization of the
Indian Tribes in this Province32 was passed. This was the first Act to
contemplate the de-construction of a person's aboriginal identity.
The Act provided that any adult male Indian who was of good
character, with no debts, who was fluent in either English or French,
would be eligible for full citizenship through "enfranchisement,"
that is they would be legally considered as a non-Indian. In theory,
Indians would then enjoy equality and all the other democratic liberal privileges along with other Canadian citizens. Any Indian who
3! E. B. Tidey, A Narrow Vision (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press, 1986) at 3-5.
32 S. Prov. C. 1857, c. 26.

LIBERAL THEORY AS A TOOL OF COLONIALISM

121

successfully satisfied these requirements would be given up to fifty
acres of land and his share of his Band's funds. 33 These laws were
adopted by the Federal Government carte blanche after
Confederation.
In 1867, the British Parliament passed the British North America
Act (hereinafter BNA Act). 34 Section 91 (24) delegated the Imperial
Crown's responsibility for Indians and lands reserved for Indians to
the Federal Government of Canada. The Federal Government took
responsibility for the management of Indians and Indian lands in
Nova Scotia. It empowered itself to do this by passing An Act
providing far the organization of the Department of the Secretary of
State of Canada, and far the management of Indian and Ordnance
Lands.35 Existing colonial Indian legislation was confirmed by the
new federal government.
The Federal Government in Nova Scotia, not being subject to
the exclusive tyranny of the electors in the province, moved against
white squatters and removed them from reserve lands, unlike the
accommodative policy the Nova Scotia colonial government had
pursued. 36 After an initial period of removing squatters from reserve
lands in the Atlantic Provinces, the Federal policy changed. The
growth of cities in the Atlantic area and the larger reserves set aside
under treaties in the prairies created demands by whites to remove
Indians from reserves near growing white towns or to lease out
"unused" reserve lands to non-Indians. The Federal Government
implemented these demands by amending the Indian Act 37 in
1919, making the dispossession of First Nations from their reserves
possible without their consent, via the infamous section 49A.3 8
Tidey, supra note 31 at 4.
Constitution Act 1867, (U.K.) 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 ..
35 s.c. 1868, c. 42.
36 R. H. Bartlett, Indian Reserves In the Atlantic Provinces of Canada (Saskatoon:
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1986) at 20-23.
37 S.C. 1911, c. 14. s.2.
3S Bartlett, supra note 36 at 26-27, citing S.C. 1911, c. 14, s. 2. Section 49A reads:
33
34

In the case of an Indian Reserve that adjoins or is situated wholly
or partly within an incorporated town or city having a
population of not less than eight thousand, and which reserve has
not been released or surrendered by the Indians, the Governor in
Council may, upon the recommendation of the Superintendent
General, refer to the judge of the Exchequer Court of Canada
for inquiry and report the question as to whether it is expedient,
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This section of the Act was used to remove the Mi'kmaq from
their Kings' Road reserve in Sydney, Nova Scotia in 1915, because
the Mi'kmaq people and their reserve were inferior beings:
Now, this Reserve abuts on King's Road, which is one of
the principal arteries of the city, a highway very much
travelled and used by the public, and upon which a large
number of fine residences are built. No one cares to live
in the immediate vicinity of the Indians. The overwhelm ing weight of the evidence is to the effect that the
Reserve retards and is a clog in the development of that
part of the city .... The removal would make the property in that neighbourhood more valuable for assessment
purposes .... The racial inequalities of the Indians, as
compared with the white man, check to a great extent
any move towards social development, a state of affairs
which, under the system now obtaining, can only grow
worse every day, as the number oflndians is increasing.39

Thus, it was the interests of the white English public and their
Liberal right to "pursue their own version of happiness" that was
recognized. The state intervened on behalf of white interests. This
intervention disregarded the interest of the Mi'kmaq in continuing

having regard to the interest of the public and the Indians of the
band for whose use the reserve is held, that the Indians should be
removed from the reserve or any part of it.
This section of the Act was developed after Parliament had to pass a special act to
expropriate the Songhee's Reserve in Victoria, B.C .. The Songhee Band would not
voluntarily surrender their ancestral lands and the Indian Act provided them with
unintended protection. In proposing this amendment to Parliament the Minister of
Indian Affairs stated:
For while we believe that the Indian, having a certain treaty
right, is entitled ordinarily to stand upon that right and get the
benefit of it, yet we believe also that there are certain
circumstances and conditions in which the Indian by standing on
his treaty rights does himself an ultimate injury as well as does an
injury to the white people, whose interests are brought into
immediate conjunction with the interests of the Indians (House
of Commons Debates, vol. IV, 3d sess., 11th Par!. 1-2 Geo.V,
1910-11, at 7827, per Frank Oliver, M.P.)

39 Re Indian Reserve, City ofSydney, Nova Scotia (1916), 42 D.L.R. 314 (Ex. Ct.)
at 316-17.
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to live at their traditional village at the mouth of the river in Sydney
harbour which had been reserved to them by law.
The presence of the Mi'kmaq triggered the "harm" principle.
The Mi'kmaq were "a clog in the development of the city" and thus
"harmed" the pursuit of commercial development by the white
folk. The Court, and the Federal Government, both obviously believed that Mi'kmaq were not to be accorded similar individual
rights to pursue their traditional economic activities, or "happiness."
"The racial inequalities of the Indians ... check ... any move towards social development."
The Indian Act also provided unintended protection for First
Nations' interests by requiring the consent of the majority of First
Nation residents on a reserve to approve any surrender of reserve
lands. Section 49A, however, removed this recognition of First
Nations' right to determine what was in their best interest. The
amendment insured that when Indian interests in land conflicted ·
with white interests, white interests would come first in law. Equal
benefit of the general liberal principle of voluntary consent was denied to the Mi'kmaq. Thus, the court in Re Indian Reserve could invoke immigrant statute law that prevented the general principles of
common law from protecting Mi'kmaq property interests. Law was
created that was explicitly based on assumptions of the racial and
cultural superiority of white interests.
Other sections of the Indian Act 40 also directly attacked First
Nations' control of their identity, community, government and
education. These sections of the Act oppress any expression of individual liberal-like rights of First Nations people to liberty (being
able to live a traditional Mi'kmaq way of life), the pursuit of happiness, and consensual government.
Section 2 of the Indian Act declares that an Indian is a person
"who pursuant to this Act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to
be registered as an Indian." Under section 6 of the current Act, a
person entitled to be registered as an Indian is any person who was
previously entitled to be registered before April 17, 1985, or omitted from the Indian Register before or after September 4, 19 51, 41

40

R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5.
These dates denote when Indian women began to be removed from Band lists
because they married non-Indians or non-status Indians. The date of 17 April 1985
ensures that non-Indian women who were married to an Indian, or a person
41
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or any person who is a member of a body of persons that has been
declared by the Governor in Council to be a Band for the purpose
of the Act. These sections empower the Federal Government to
identify who is Indian and who is not. This strikes at the most basic
level of First Nations self-determination, the right of individuals to
define themselves politically and culturally.
This section of the Act denied the Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq the
individual and societal right to define their personhood and themselves as a nation of peoples. The Federal government has also utilized this power to terminate the legal existence of thousands of
Mi'kmaq women and children in Nova Scotia. If a Mi'kmaq
woman married a non-Indian or non-status Indian, she, and any
subsequent children of the marriage, were involuntarily enfranchised. By comparison, if a white Canadian women married someone who did not have Canadian citizenship she was not forced to
accept her spouse's political and cultural identity and lose her
Canadian citizenship. Instead, if the non-Canadian spouse resided
in Canada he was able to become a Canadian citizen. A Canadian
citizen could only lose their citizenship by voluntarily renouncing it.
In addition, section 17(1) of the Indian Act empowers the
Minister of Indian Affairs to create new Indian bands, split or
amalgamate old ones, and extinguish the legal existence of a Band
through the enfranchisement of whole Bands.
In 1951, the Minister oflndian Affairs used this power to unilaterally split the Mi'kmaq nation in Nova Scotia into eleven separate bands. 42 Formerly, all Mi'kmaq people in Nova Scotia were
considered one Band and the traditional Grand Chief of the
Mi'kmaq was considered the head of the Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq
Band by federal authorities. The division of the Nova Scotia
Mi'kmaq into eleven bands attacked the political, cultural, spiritual
structure of Mi'kmaq society, the individual rights of Mi'kmaq to
choose who would govern them and whose rules would be used in
governing. This section empowered the Federal Government to
impose its vision of political, cultural, and spiritual norms on the
Mi'kmaq community. It gave Federal bureaucrats the power to
withhold Liberal individual rights that would have provided
Mi'kmaq people with the opportunity to choose between their traentitled to be registered as an Indian, retain the right to be registered "as if they
were Indians."
42 Bartlett, supra note 36 at 29.
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ditional vision of community and the Anglo-immigrant vision of
community.
Sections 114-122 are the most destructive sections of the Indian
Act with respect to the maintenance of Mi'kmaq culture and values.
These sections empower the Minister of Indian Affairs to force First
Nations children to attend Anglo-schools that indoctrinate First
Nations children in the racist history and ideology of the colonial
immigrants. It teaches only one language, English. It awards the
minds of First Nations children to whichever Euro-christian denomination claims the right to spiritually colonize a First Nation.
These sections have made it impossible for grandparents to coherently pass on their language and culture to their grandchildren.43
These sections of the Act enabled the Minister of Indian Affairs, between 1940-1970, to take Mi'kmaq children from their families
and communities and to put them in Catholic Boarding Schools in
Nova Scotia. In these foreign institutions, Mi'kmaq children were
punished for practising the Mi'kmaq language and subjected to
mental, physical and, in many cases, to sexual abuse. 44 This program has inflicted immeasurable injury on these children, now
adults, who experienced this trauma.
This program withheld from Mi'kmaq parents the Liberal individual right of personal liberty to determine the kind of education
their children would receive. Federal officials saw a traditional
Mi'kmaq education as being "harmful" to their plan of assimilating
Mi'kmaq children, thus justifying the use of force used to take
Mi'kmaq children from their families and communities and to
place them in boarding schools. Federal officials made individual
decisions on what the "best interests" of the children were. They
imposed their own liberty of choice in place of the Mi'kmaq parents
right to choose how to educate their children.
The denial of the equal Liberal rights for Mi'kmaq people by
the Nova Scotia and Federal Governments was mitigated to some
extent by the Indian Act. Reserves were special zones. The
Government created them as transitional areas for assimilation, but
43

In Mi'kmaq communities the grandparents were the teachers for their
grandchildren. Oral history of their families, their hunting territories, how to hunt
different animals at different places at different times of the year, of exciting events
in their lives, of the right thing to do in different circumstances and information
about many other things were passed from grandparent to grandchildren.
44 I. T.S. Knockwood, Out ofthe Depths (Lockeport: Roseway Publishing, 1992).
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First Nations used them to undermine the objective of the Act.45 As
long as Mi'kmaq people did not voluntarily enfranchise themselves,
remained on the reserve, and did not allow themselves to appear to
be a candidate for involuntary enfranchisement, they were able to
maintain some elements of the Mi'kmaq vision of community,
language, and culture. By doing so, it could be argued that they
were exercising the Liberal right to pursue their own vision of
liberty and individual happiness. However, the opportunities for
Mi'kmaq people to preserve their culture and values were limited.
The assimilation objective of the Federal Government was pervasive. Indians were to be assimilated as quickly as possible. None of
the white Liberal rights were to be accorded to Mi'kmaq people if it
meant that they would have the opportunity to choose to live as
Mi'kmaq instead of British immigrants. The rule of law would
provide no protection to Mi'kmaq people trying to exercise
Mi'kmaq liberties.
45 Tidey, supra note 31 at 48-51. In 1920 the Deputy Superintendent of Indian
Affairs, Duncan Scott, convinced his Minister to submit Bill 14 to Parliament to
amend the Indian Act empowering the department officials to involuntarily
enfranchise Indians whom they considered no longer in need of "wardship status."
Testifying before a Parliamentary committee on the Bill,
Scott said:
I think it would be in the interests of good administration if the
provisions with regard to enfranchisement were further
extended to enable the Department to enfranchise individual
Indians or a Band of Indians without the necessity of obtaining
their consent thereto in cases where it was found upon
investigation that the continuance of wardship was no longer in
the interests of the public or the Indians.
When he was asked what the department's ultimate aim was, Scott replied:
I want to get rid of the Indian problem. I do not think as a
matter of fact, that this country ought to continuously protect a
class of people who are able to stand alone. That is my whole
point. Our objective is to continue until there is not a single
Indian in Canada who has not been absorbed into the body
politic, and there is no Indian question, and no Indian
Department and that is the whole object of this Bill.
Tidey notes that Bill 14 was passed, but repealed two years later when McKenzie
King's Government was elected. However, the enfranchisement board was left in
place, but the initiation of enfranchisement was to be considered by the board only
upon application of an Indian.
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The history of the relationship between the Mi'kmaq people in
Nova Scotia and the Anglo-immigrants' governments may be
summarized in three themes:
First, there is legal acceptance of the doctrine of aboriginal rights and treaties existing in the law of nature and
nations, with contractual principles ordering the jurisdiction of European nations and the American nations.
Second, the law recognizes the necessity of uniting
American nations in a political commonwealth by international treaties of protection, so that they can be protected by the ultimate sovereign against his subjects and
other sovereigns. The third theme, the dark theme, is
that once within the colonizer's legal system, each protecting government is mystically given by its courts the
unlimited power to extinguish Indian treaty and aboriginal rights for the good of the rest of the [Anglo] society.
Moreover, the courts fail to question the legitimacy validity of the governmental actions under a command theory
of law, and the basic contractual nature of political power
in international law and political theory is ignored. 46

III. LIBERAL THEORY AND THE PROCESS OF
NEWFOUNDLAND'S CONFEDERATION

Newfoundland did not confederate with the other colonies in
1867. British subjects in Newfoundland were not allowed to settle
and own land in Newfoundland until 1824 when the Act to
Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland, 169847 was repealed along
with the old customary law governing those who came for the seasonal fishery. There was no full time government until 1832. It was
not until 1855 that British subjects in Newfoundland were granted
the privilege of having responsible government. Newfoundland
continued under responsible government until it went bankrupt in
1934. England took over its debts and direct administration from
1934 until confederation in 1949. 48

46
47
48

Henderson, supra note 3 at 220.
Statute IO & 11 Will. 3., c. 25, 1698.
D. W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland (London: MacMillan, 1895) at

427-29.
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In 1947, Newfoundlanders were permitted by the British
Government to elect a National Convention for the purpose of debating the future political development of Newfoundland. The four
options that were available were: continued Commission of
Government, return to responsible government, confederation with
Canada, or joining the United States. The later option was dropped
by the National Convention. In 1947, a delegation from the
National Convention was sent to Ottawa to enter into preliminary
discussions to formulate the terms of confederation with Canada.
In 1949, a referendum was held to determine which of the remaining three options the people of Newfoundland would choose as
their system of government.
Prior to the referendum, the groups advocating for confederation or responsible government toured the outports delivering
speeches and information on whichever political alternative they
wished to encourage people to support. Thus, rural British subjects
in Newfoundland were given some opportunity to be informed
about the nature of the political alternatives available. Although a
rough version of informed consent, it satisfied the British and
Canadian Governments that the referendum vote could be seen as
the free and voluntary consent of each individual to the outcome of
the voting.
The first referendum failed to indicate a majority for any of the
three options. The Commission of government, having the least
number of supporters was dropped from the second referendum.
The second referendum showed that 52% approved confederation
with Canada as the country in which they would become citizens
and as the kind of democratic government the people of
Newfoundland preferred. 49
4 9 R. Gwyn, Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary (Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart, 1972) at 111-12.
In attempting to obtain the break down of votes from each outport the author
of this paper was informed by the Provincial archivists that the official ballot count
for each outport were destroyed after being sent in to St. John's. It is rumoured that
the opponents to confederation wanted verification of the results from the First
Nations communities in Newfoundland-Labrador. It was known that First Nations
peoples had never voted in responsible government elections before, did not speak
English and were rumoured to not have voted or were instructed to vote a certain
way by their missionaries. The missionaries were known to be siding with the
supporters of confederation and were suspected of influencing the voting in First
Nation communities, if there was any voting.
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The process of Newfoundland's confederation with Canada is a
demonstration of the five basic principles of Liberal philosophy.
The Imperial government granted British subjects in
Newfoundland the opportunity to be self-determining in respect of
the system of government under which they would live, thus operationalizing the ideas of individual liberty, freedom and the pursuit
of happiness. It permitted individuals to be self-determining by
choosing who would govern them and what kind of government it
would be, thus determining the limits of its authority over them
and, in their choice of democratic government, protecting their
lives, liberties, and property by the rule of law.

IV.

OUTSIDE THE TERMS OF UNION: DID FIRST
NATIONS IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR
CONSENT TO CONFEDERATION AND
ENFRANCHISEMENT?

In 1947, Messrs. Burry (a Moravian Missionary from Labrador),
Ashbourne (from St. John's, Newfoundland) and J. R .. Smallwood
(from Gambo, Newfoundland), all representing the National
Convention of Newfoundland, met with senior officials from the
Department of Mines and Energy, the Department then responsible for Indian Affairs. The Federal officials were assigned to the
sub-committee on Indian Affairs by the Department of External
Affairs which led and coordinated the confederation negotiations
for Canada. 50 The purpose of this committee was to ascertain "how
As the organizer of the first Aboriginal political organization in
Newfoundland-Labrador in 1973 this author spoke with Innu, Inuit and Mi'kmaq
elders who said no voting took place in their communities until some years after
confederation. If votes from First Nation communities in Newfoundland-Labrador
were counted in 1949 they would appear to be grounds to view them as seriously
suspect, or at the very least uninformed, and not voluntary in the sense of an exercise
of self-determination. If the First Nations peoples had understood they were voting
to oppress their identities as Aboriginal peoples it is unlikely they would have voted
for confederation, if they voted at all.
50 Senior officials from the Department of External Affairs and other line
departments of the Canadian government were assigned to discuss and draft the
terms by which Newfoundland might consider confederation with Canada. R.
Hoey was director ofindian Affairs and C. Jackson was acting Deputy Minister of
Mines and Resources, the Department the Indian Affairs branch was in. These were
the two most senior officials responsible for Indian Affairs in Canada.
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the Indians and Eskimos in Newfoundland-Labrador, if any still
exist, would be provided for in the event of confederation." The
Canadian officials responsible for Indian Affairs advised that "in the
event of Newfoundland becoming a province of Canada the
Indians and Eskimos would be the sole responsibility of the federal
government and that the following are some of the benefits that
would come to them." Twelve benefits were listed: free education,
free medical services, family allowances, land reserves for settlements and traplines; free conservation projects, fishing projects and
handicraft projects; trading posts provided by the federal government if there were no private ones; exemption from land and income taxes; protection by law of Indian rights recognized in the
[Indian] Act; voting rights if they were no burden on the province
or a municipality; no right to vote if on welfare; no right to use intoxicating liquors; and relief for the aged, but no old age pension.5 1
These were the core federal services meant to assimilate First
Nations people in a transitional manner over a period of time.
Newfoundland representatives held numerous discussions with
their own lawyers and officials of the British and Canadian
Governments. They also intensively debated the options of government that were available to choose from within the National
Convention in Newfoundland. However, the Anglo-Newfoundland
officials never consulted with the First Nations in Newfoundland
and Labrador nor asked them to determine what their position
might be on confederation issues. When the terms of union were
confirmed in the Constitution Act, 1949, there was no clause that
explicitly dealt with the relationship between Canada and First
Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador. First Nations people had no
representation in the confederation negotiations and none of the
terms of union recognized their existence. They were not included,
as First Nations peoples, in confederation between Canada and
Newfoundland.
The terms of union between Canada and Newfoundland, however, did preserve federal legislative jurisdiction over "Indians, and
Lands reserved for Indians." Section 3 states:

5l N.A.C., M.G. 30e, 159, vol. 4, file-"Indians and Eskimos of Newfoundland,"
submitted 1950, Minutes, 2 September 1947, Report of the Indian and Eskimo
Sub-committee.
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The British North American Acts, 1867 to 1940, shall apply to the Province of Newfoundland in the same way,
and to the like extent as they apply to the provinces
heretofore comprised in Canada, as if the Province of
Newfoundland had been one of the provinces originally
united, except in so far as varied by these Terms and except such provisions as are in terms made or by reasonable
intendment may be held to be specially applicable to or
only to affect one or more and not all of the provinces
originally united.5 2

Subsection 91 (24) of the BNA Act, 1867 was not altered by any
of the terms of union. Thus, Newfoundland and Canada were bound
by subsection 91 (24) of the BNA Act, 1867. The responsibility for
"Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians" continued to be a federal
constitutional responsibility. However, this did not stop federal
officials from deliberately avoiding fulfillment of their direct and
exclusive constitutional responsibility.
The denial of freedom of self-determination to the First
Nations started with their exclusion from the Newfoundland
National Convention in 1947. The exclusion of First Nations was
continued in the Newfoundland referendums in 1947-48. The exclusion of First Nations was extended into the negotiations of the
terms of union when their rights and interests were deliberately left
out of the terms of union in 1949. As a result of their exclusion from
the confederation process, the people of the First Nations
communities in Newfoundland-Labrador never participated in nor
consented to the process of confederation between Newfoundland
and Canada. Past Newfoundland Colonial and Commission
Governments had never made treaties nor passed any laws that
applied directly to First Nations people. Up to the time of
confederation, the First Nation societies in NewfoundlandLabrador had lived independently based on their own selfdetermined accommodative relationships with anglo-immigrants
and their own customary law.

52

The Constitution Act, 1949.
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V. A NEW FEDERAL POLICY OF ASSIMILATION BY
INVOLUNTARY ENFRANCHISEMENT

The implementation of a new federal experimental policy to assimilate First Nations began in September of 1949. H. L. Keenlyside,
Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, the Department responsible for Indian affairs at that time, wrote to N. A. Robertson,
Secretary to the Cabinet, informing him that Cabinet had decided
on January 25, 1949, prior to confederation, that
'The government agreed that the decision respecting the
case of Indians and Eskimos in Newfoundland and
Labrador following union be deferred until such time as a
satisfactory arrangement could be made with the
Provincial government after an election of a Provincial
Legislature in Newfoundland' .... I am writing to bring
to your attention the fact that this department is not taking any action regarding the care of Indians and Eskimos
in Newfoundland and Labrador pending the conclusion
of the satisfactory arrangement referred to in this quotation.53

D. MacKay, the director of the Indian Affairs Branch under
Keenlyside, prepared a "Secret" memorandum for his Deputy setting out recommendations as to what position the Federal government should take with respect to their responsibility for First
Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador. MacKay stated that he had
met with K. J. Carter, past Commissioner of Resources (British
Commission Government in Newfoundland) and now Deputy
Minister of Resources in the Newfoundland Government, on 7
October 1948, and with J. R. Smallwood on 15 November 1948.
MacKay claimed that on both occasions it was agreed that the
Province should administer Indian and Eskimo Affairs, "subject to
a suitable grant or subsidy by the Dominion, rather than have the
Indians brought under the Indian Act." His reasons for this were:
At the present time the Indians of Newfoundland have
full citizenship status ... and if placed under the Indian
Act . .. their civil status would be reduced. It was felt it
would be a retrograde step to deprive Indians of any political rights which they enjoy at the present time. This
53 NAC RG 2/18, Vol. 172, File N-18-3. 13 September 1949, H. L. Keenlyside,
D.M., Mines and Resources, to N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet.
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view is in accord with the general aim ofIndian administration in Canada which is that, in due course, the Indians
should take their place as full citizens of Canada. This objective was emphasised in discussions before the Special Joint
Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons which
sat during the 1946, 1947 and 1948 Sessions ofParliament.
Another reason for not bringing the Newfoundland
Indians under the Indian Act is that they do not live on
reserves and could not be readily adapted to our system .... It is understood that there are several hundred
Indians in Central and Southern Labrador, who are not
under any special supervision or restrictions except that
they are not permitted to buy liquor. On the Island of
Newfoundland, the Indians [Mi'kmaq] are merged with
other citizens and have full citizenship rights. Their number is not known but is said to be small. I may mention
that the Indians on the Island are descendants of
Micmacs who emigrated from Prince Edward Island and
Nova Scotia years ago. The original Indians of
Newfoundland, the Beothucks, are extinct .... It will be
noted that the expenses referred to in Mr. Carter's letter
are for the small group in Northern Labrador but a grant
or subsidy would involve all the Indians of the Province with
the exception of those on the Island of Newfoundland
(emphasis added). 54

This letter set the position the Federal Government would take for
the next 16 years.
During this time the Federal Government provided a few small
grants to the Government of Newfoundland for tuberculosis programs in Northern Labrador, but refused to assume any responsibility for First Nations in the Province. Instead, federal officials would
claim that First Nations in Newfoundland and Labrador were
"enfranchised" and, therefore, were not Indians pursuant to the
Indian Act or subsection 91(24) of the ENA Act. Thus, there were
no federal obligations owed to them.
In 1962, the Hon. W. J. Browne, Solicitor General, referred a
letter from the Roman Catholic School Board of Northern
Labrador to Hon. Ellen Fairclough, Minister responsible for Indian
54 NAC RG 2/18, Vol. 172, File N-18-3. 25 October 1949, H. L. Keenlyside,
D. M., Mines and Resources, to N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet,
correspondence and attached "Secret" Memorandum.

134

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

Affairs. The letter from the Catholic School authorities requested
federal assistance for construction of Indian day schools in
Sheshashit and Davis Inlet, Labrador, on the basis that the Federal
Government had responsibility for Indians. Ms. Fairclough replied:
As you are aware, this is a problem that has arisen on numerous occasions, and the position which has been taken
by the federal government is that the Indians of
Newfoundland were enfranchised and full citizens of the
Province on the day when Newfoundland entered
Canada in 1949, and that consequently the federal government has no constitutional responsibility for the persons oflndian ethnic origin in the Province.55

Thus, the Mi'kmaq, Innu and Inuit Nations of Newfoundland and
Labrador were deemed to have been already assimilated even
though this was not negotiated in the terms of union or accomplished by subsequent Federal legislation. At that time, in order for
an Indian to be enfranchised he or she had to have de-Indianized
themselves as set out in the Indian Act. If a First Nation's woman
married a non-Indian or a non-status Indian, she would have been
involuntarily enfranchised. In order for a male Indian to be enfranchised he had to speak English or French, be free of debt and be
considered of good character (by the local Indian Agent or Cleric).
He could then apply for enfranchisement to the Indian Affairs
board set up to review such applications.
In 1963, an exchange of views on the federal government's policy of Indian assimilation between the Hon. Arthur Laing, Minister
of Northern Affairs and National Resources, who was then responsible for Eskimo Affairs, and R. G. Robertson, Secretary to the
Cabinet, transpired. Robertson wrote:
The Indian Affairs Branch have felt for some time that
the most fruitful line of progress for many of the
Indians-perhaps for all of them-has to be in the direction of more complete integration with other people in
the provinces where they live. The reservations are much
too small to support anything like the total population
and the special aspects of treatment create a separateness

55 21 March 1962, Hon. Ellen Fairclough to Hon. W.
General, in Cabinet Memorandum of22 April 1965.

J.
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that in many cases at least appears to operate, in the long
term, to the disadvantage of the Indians.
A number of the provinces have problems with respect to the people of mixed blood that are essentially
the same as those that involve the Indians and, in many
respects, I understand that the problems are similar for
large groups of economically depressed people who are
simply 'white' with no racial mixture. For these reasons,
some of the provinces too have expressed an interest in
discussing arrangements under which differences in
treatment would gradually disappear. I do not think
anyone believes that a quick change in status or treatment
is possible or desirable-it is rather a question of the di rection in which gradual movement should occur. The
Indian Affairs Branch are, like you, very much concerned
that any changes should carry with it the general views
and wishes of the Indian people. At the same time, I
think they are aware that there might be insoluble problems if one assumed that there had to be a definite con currence [by the Indians] expressed in a program of adjustment.56

After the election of Lester Pearson's Liberal government in
1964, J. W. Pickersgill, a Liberal M.P. from Newfoundland, was
appointed as Minister of Transport. Pickersgill was the first M.P.
from Newfoundland to witness and appreciate the full extent of
federal services and expenditures on First Nations across Canada.
What he witnessed must have impressed upon him the unfairness of
the federal policy regarding First Nations in NewfoundlandLabrador. He had received copies of correspondence from
Newfoundland ministers to other federal ministers concerning federal subsidies for Newfoundland's expenditures on Indians and
Eskimos. The interim agreements that Newfoundland had with
Ottawa for reimbursement for health programs and facilities for

SG 23 October 1963, Hon. Arthur Laing, Minister of Northern Affairs, to R. G.
Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet. This correspondence was provided to]. W.
Pickersgill, M.P. (NF) after he had asked Prime Minister Pearson for a legal
review of the federal position on Aboriginal people in Newfoundland (Letter of 21
October 1963). Pearson refused Pickersgill's request for a legal review saying that
it was a matter of policy for Cabinet to review, but provided Pickersgill with
Laing's and Robertson's correspondence to give him a sample of the policy issue of
how assimilation oflndians should proceed (Letter of24 October 1963).
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Indians and Eskimos in Labrador were expiring and Newfoundland
officials were under the impression that these subsidies would not
be renewed. Pickersgill was asked by Newfoundland officials to
take these matters up with Prime Minister Pearson.57
Pickersgill first tried to persuade the Prime Minister to begin a
legal review or a reference put to the Supreme Court of Canada to
determine if the Federal Government had responsibility for First
Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador, but Pearson refused. 58 Having
failed to achieve any results from within, Pickersgill tried another
political avenue. He wrote to Premier Smallwood on March 17,
1964, stating:
As you and I know, the federal government has never
been willing to assert its constitutional jurisdiction over
the Indians and Eskimos of Newfoundland but instead
has adopted a "Pontius Pilate" attitude. I think the time
has now come to put our government on the spot and my
suggestion would be that you write a letter to the Prime
Minister somewhat along the lines of the enclosed draft
but that, instead of signing it and sending it as a formal
communication, you send it along with a covering letter
asking his advice as to whether it should be modified in
anyway. I see no other way of getting this matter brought
into focus and I am sure it is very important that it be
brought into proper focus before negotiations with
Quebec are finally settled. 59

In Pickersgill's draft letter for Premier Smallwood to send to
Prime Minister Pearson, he stated that during the terms of union it
was Canada who refused to accept responsibility for Indians and
Eskimos. The draft letter then pointed out that the terms of union
had not changed Canada's constitutional responsibility for Indians
and Eskimos throughout Newfoundland:
since no reference was made to Indians and Eskimos in
the Terms of Union, the B.N.A. Act as interpreted by the
Courts must apply to them in Newfoundland to pre cisely the same extent as it applies to them in Quebec or
5? 21 October 1963, Correspondence, J. W. Pickersgill, Secretary of State, to
Prime Minister Pearson.
ss 24 October 1963, Correspondence, Prime Minister Pearson to J. W.
Pickersgill, Secretary of State.
59 17 March 1964, J. W. Pickersgill to Premier J. Smallwood.
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in other Provinces, and that therefore the Parliament and
the Government of Canada cannot divest themselves of
their jurisdiction or their responsibility.
It would be particularly difficult for us to acquiesce
in neglect of this responsibility in Newfoundland at the
very time it is being asserted [federal responsibility] so
strongly by the Government of Canada in relation to the
Eskimos of Quebec.
We feel that Newfoundland is entitled to equal
treatment with Quebec and other Provinces. We would
be prepared to have the Government of Canada take over
full responsibility for the Indians of Indians and Eskimos of
Labrador, as you presumably have a right to do under the
Constitution (emphasis added). 6o

Thus, having built the bargaining position that, since
Newfoundland was not being treated equally with other provinces
in respect to federal expenditures on Aboriginal peoples, the
Federal Government should take over all responsibility for Indians
and Eskimos in Labrador, or, in the alternative:
if the Government of Canada would still prefer, as it indicated it would in 1948, to have the Indians and
Eskimos of Newfoundland treated in precisely the same
way as other inhabitants of the Province, we are quite
prepared to continue on that basis provided the
Government of Canada will give us the same degree of
financial support as is given directly by the Government
of Canada in respect of the Indians and Eskimos living in
other provinces. Naturally, if such payments were made,
we would be quite prepared to accept any reasonable
measures of supervision or inspection which the appropriate departments of the Government of Canada felt
should be imposed to make sure that the money was being used for the welfare and advancement of the Indians
and Eskimos and that their Constitutional rights were
fully safeguarded. 61

This letter was sent unaltered to Prime Minister Pearson by
Premier Smallwood on March 23, 1964. As a result, Prime Minister
Pearson directed his Minister responsible for Indian Affairs, the
60
61

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Hon. Arthur Laing, to prepare a Cabinet Memorandum on the issue of Federal responsibility for Indians and Eskimos in
Newfoundland and Labrador.
On April 22, 1965 this Memorandum was submitted to the
Prime Minister. In the covering letter, the Minister makes it clear
that the recommendations in the Memorandum are aimed at accomplishing the general objective the Federal Government had for
all Indians:
Moreover, the arrangement with respect to Indians is a
dynamic one and gives promise of the eventual achieve ment of Canada's objective which would see the Indians
take their place in the larger community receiving services
and accepting responsibilities on the same basis as all
other citizens. 62

The objective of assimilation is described in these same terms in the
"Background" summary of the Memorandum. It is totally inconsistent with the Federal premise that First Nations in NewfoundlandLabrador were enfranchised. To be enfranchised an Indian had to
be considered assimilated. If the First Nations in Newfoundland
and Labrador had already been assimilated, the Federal objective
would have been already achieved, therefore, there was no need to
give the Newfoundland Government any money for Indians and
Eskimos who no longer existed in that "different" (unassimilated)
state!
Despite this inconsistency, Federal officials had, on two occasions, requested legal opinions from the Federal Department of
Justice on federal responsibilities for First Nations in
Newfoundland and Labrador. The Department of Justice did not
concur with the belief of federal officials that the Federal
Government had no responsibility for First Nations in
Newfoundland and Labrador.
In 1950, Deputy Minister F. P. Varcoe had been asked for an
opinion by N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet:
as to the precise legal extent of the federal government's
responsibility insofar as Indians and Eskimos residing in
Newfoundland and Labrador are concerned ... with re-

62

22 April 1965, Hon. Arthur Laing to Prime Minister Pearson.
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spect to federal jurisdiction over, and responsibility for
Newfoundland Indians and Eskimos.63
Deputy Minister Varcoe replied:
It is the responsibility of the federal government to formulate policies and carry out all policies that are directed
at dealing with Indian or Indian problems. Such policy is
to be formulated by Parliament and the executive. This
responsibility carries with it the responsibility of providing money to be devoted to the carrying out of policies
in relation to the Indians. 64
Another opinion was sought by Mr. W. Fischer, Legal Advisor
to the Department of Northern Affairs, in preparing the Cabinet
Memorandum of April 1965. Fischer had contacted Deputy
Attorney-General A. F. Dridger asking for his opinion on the draft
memorandum. Fischer was troubled by the inconsistency between
the Federal Government's past policy and new initiative with respect to Aboriginal peoples in Newfoundland. Fischer wanted to
know how to explain why the Government of Canada had failed to
accept Varcoe' s 1950 opinion and explicitly rejected responsibility
in Hon. Ellen Fairclough' s letter of March 21, 1962. 6 5 Mr. Driedger
replied that Mr. Varcoe's opinion of 1950, "as to the constitutional
position is correct." He added that he saw no conflict between Ms.
Fairclough's letter and Mr. Varcoe's opinion because
Mr. Varcoe was dealing with legislative authority, that is,
the power to pass law, while in the fourth paragraph of his
letter he was speaking of responsibility, or to use another
word, the obligation to formulate and carry out policies.
I suggest that it is this second aspect of the matter that is
the subject of Mrs. Fairclough' s letter. Whether the situation of Eskimos and Indians in Newfoundland is such

63 31 March 1950, N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet, to F. P. Varcoe,
Deputy Attorney General, Dept. of Justice.
64 14 April 1950, F. P. Varcoe, Deputy Attorney General, Dept. of Justice, to
N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet.
65 Supra note 58 for citation.
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that special policies and programmes are required is, of
course, not a legal question. 66

Either Mr. Driedger had not read, or misinterpreted Mrs.
Fairclough's statement that the Federal Government had no
"constitutional responsibility" for Indians and Eskimos in
Newfoundland and Labrador. Mrs. Fairclough was speaking of
legislative authority. Her statement is an obvious reference to the
past federal position that subsection 91 (24) of the BNA Act, I 867
does not apply to Indians or Eskimos in Newfoundland or
Labrador.
The Memorandum of 1965 contains a legal review of the constitutional position of Indians and Eskimos in Newfoundland and
Labrador. It summarizes the previous federal legal opinions and
what the federal officials believed about First Nations m
Newfoundland-Labrador:
The opinions make clear that the federal parliament has
exclusive legislative authority with respect to Indians and
Eskimos of the Province of Newfoundland, and the associated responsibility to formulate policies directed toward dealing with Indian and Eskimo problems.67

The drafter of the legal opinion in the Memorandum was still
trying to reconcile why federal practice was not following the
opinion Mr. Varcoe gave in 1950 with respect to federal constitutional responsibility for First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador.
The writer sets out Minister Fairclough's position in 1962:
Thus, the Indians and Eskimos in Labrador were, at the
time of union, in the same position as persons of Indian
origin in the provinces who have been enfranchised or
who are Meris ... for whom the federal government has
not considered itself obligated .... 68

However, the review then acknowledges that to characterize the
First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador as enfranchised Indians

66 23 November 1964, A. F. Driedger, Deputy Attorney General, to W. Fischer,
Legal Advisor to the Dept. of Northern Affairs. In the Cabinet Memorandum of
April 22, 1965.
67 22 April 1965, Cabinet Memorandum, "Contributions to Newfoundland
Respecting Indians and Eskimos."
68 Ibid.
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or Metis was discriminatory and inconsistent with the treatment of
Western Aboriginal groups:
It is understood that the persons of Eskimo origin in
Labrador have a high infusion of white blood and their
situation, therefore, might to this extent be equated with
that of the Metis. It should be noted, however, that the
Metis, in Western Canada at least, were given a choice at
the time the treaties were negotiated as to whether or not
they would continue to be considered as Indians or accept script for settlement as ordinary citizens of the
country. This option has never been extended to the
Eskimos of Labrador. The other process whereby Indians
no longer come within the scope of federal programs and
policies also depend upon the individual's decision
through enfranchisement, by marriage, or by voluntary
resettlement in non-Indian areas.
It is understood that the Indian population of
Labrador has not had the same degree of relationship
with non-Indians and that there is very little white blood
amongst these people. In fact, it seems probable that the
Indians of Labrador are much more Indian, in blood, in
way of life and in attitudes and customs than many
Indian groups on the mainland of Canada. As with the
Eskimos, the Indians in Labrador have had no choice as
had persons of Indian origin in Canada who are not now
considered to be the policy or financial responsibility of
Canada.
This interpretation of Mrs. Fairclough's letter is
therefore open to question on the grounds first that,
contrary to enfranchised Indians, the Indians and
Eskimos have been given no choice with respect to their
status; second, that they (particularly the Indians) remain
as distinct and separate communities clearly identifiable
by language, culture, way of life and problems; third,
that these two groups have required, and will need for
some time in the future, special programs similar to those
provided Indians and Eskimos elsewhere in Canada and,
fourth, that these people in Labrador should have access
to the same resources and programs as Indians and
Eskimos elsewhere in Canada.
In light of the opinions given by Mr. Varcoe on April
14, 1950, and Mr. Driedger on November 23, 1964, it
seems distinctly possible that Indians in the Province of
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Newfoundland could demand to be registered under the
Indian Act, thereby becoming eligible for the special assistance provided by the Act for persons registered in accordance with it, and it seems distinctly possible that
such a demand would have to be complied with.
Although the constitutional position in terms of legislative authority is clear, the legal position really rests
upon whether the Indians and Eskimos of Labrador can
be considered as such in terms of the British North
America Act. The conclusion to be drawn from the outline
of the situation given above seems to support a substantial
degree offederal obligation with respect to the formulation
ofpolicies and the voting offunds to provide for programs on
their behalf(emphasis in original). 69

This review echoes R. G. Robertson's remarks in his 1963 letter
to Hon. Arthur Laing, wherein he stated that there should be, at a
minimum, consultation with First Nations on Federal policies that
affected them. However, Federal and Newfoundland officials provided no such opportunity to First Nations in Newfoundland and
Labrador. First Nations were kept deliberately ignorant of decisions
by the Newfoundland and Federal Governments that would deny
them the liberty to determine their relationship with Canada and
Newfoundland.
With regard to the Mi'kmaq people on the Island of
Newfoundland the position conveyed by the provincial premier and
other officials in 1949-50 was added in the back pages of the
Memorandum. It stated:
There are a certain number of Indians resident on the
Island of Newfoundland, but since most of these people
have been or are in the process of being integrated with
the white population it has been informally agreed with the
Provincial authorities that no special arrangements need be
made on their behalf by the Federal Government
(emphasis added). 70

This statement was incorrect. Conne River on the south coast of
Newfoundland, Badger and Glenwood in central Newfoundland
and St. Georges, in St. Georges Bay on the west coast of

69
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Newfoundland, were functioning Mi'kmaq communities in 1949.71
Apparently there was very little research done on the history of First
Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador by Federal officials. The
drafters of the Cabinet Memorandum relate the history of the
relationship between First Nations, the British Crown and the
Colonial Government of Newfoundland in two very important
sentences:
There are no treaties or agreements with the native population similar to the Indian treaties which exist in the rest
of Canada. Theoretically, at least, Indians and Eskimos
are fully enfranchised except for the privilege of purchasing liquor (emphasis in original).72

The first statement is accurate for the Innu and Inuit Nations in
Labrador, but not correct for the Mi'kmaq on the Island of
Newfoundland whose Chief signed an adhesion to the treaty of
1752 in 1761. The second statement is presumptuous and incorrect
in light of the protection of the prerogative law of the Royal
Proclamation of 1763 that set Indians and Lands reserved for
Indians apart from Anglo-British subjects in North America.
Further, it presumes that informal agreements between federal and
provincial officials deeming First Nations people as enfranchised
and dispensing with federal constitutional responsibilities to them
would be sufficient to amend subsection 91 (24) of the B.NA. Act.
The Cabinet Memorandum concludes:
From a purely constitutional point of view, it is difficult
to see how the Federal Government can escape at least
some responsibility for Indians and Eskimos in the new
province as the British North America Act vests in the
Parliament of Canada exclusive legislative authority in respect of this group. 73

In a draft letter from Prime Minister Pearson to Premier
Smallwood, the Federal Government sought to circumvent its con7 l As the organizer of the first Aboriginal political organization in
Newfoundland-Labrador, I found distinct Mi'kmaq communities and groups in
these same locations in Newfoundland in 1971. They still practiced an adaptive
form of Mi'kmaq culture, considered themselves as Mi'kmaq and were identified
by neighbouring communities of Newfoundlanders as Mi'kmaq.
72 Supra note 67.
73
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stitutional responsibility for First Nations in Newfoundland and
Labrador. In the letter, the proposal was that Newfoundland could
administer Indian and Eskimo Affairs, that the Federal
Government would provide a capped level of subsidy, and that the
agreement would be reviewed and re-negotiated every five years.
This periodic renewal was proposed by federal officials who hoped
that in the next five to ten years federal responsibility for Indians
would be shifted to the provinces throughout Canada as part of the
federal assimilation scheme. First Nations in NewfoundlandLabrador would be used by federal officials as an example of the
new policy. The five-year agreements would permit the federal
government to phase itself out of all responsibility for Indian Affairs
in the future.74
The proposal set out in the draft letter was approved without
changes by Cabinet and was sent to Premier Smallwood on May

74

22 April 1965, Memorandum for Cabinet:
Recommendations
13. After considering the various ways in which the problem can
be met, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the
federal government should not assume continuing commitments
on a permanent basis in respect of Indians and Eskimos in
Labrador .... Arguments supporting this point of view are set
out in Appendix "A." ... 17..... Although the proposal involves
relatively large Federal disbursements during the first few years,
it holds the dual advantage of enabling a really significant
contribution to be made towards the rehabilitation of Labrador
and, at the same time, of gradually relieving the Federal
Government of all direct responsibility, both financial and
administrative, for this segment of the Indian and Eskimo
population of Canada.
Appendix "A" Arguments Against Continuing Federal
Participation In Indian and Eskimo Affairs In Northern
Labrador
1. The Government's Indian policy in the rest of Canada has
been for a number of years to encourage voluntary
enfranchisement in order to enable Indians to take their place in
sociery on the basis of complete equality with other Canadian
citizens. It would be a retrograde step if the Federal Government
were to do anything that would result in converting the Indians
and Eskimos of Northern Labrador into wards of the state.
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25, 1965.75 Prime Minister Pearson concluded his unconstitutional
proposal by reiterating the policy the Federal Government wanted
to extend to every other province in Canada:
I know it is your objective, as well as ours, to see that the
Indians and Eskimos take their place as full participating
members of the provincial community, accepting all the
responsibilities and receiving all the benefits of other citizens.76

What the Prime Minister openly admits in this final paragraph is
that the Innu and Inuit are not enfranchised and still need to be assimilated. This makes them no different than any other First
Nation in other areas of Canada with whom the Federal
Government made treaties and who received special servicescovertly aimed at assimilating them in a transitional process.
This Federal decision radically departed from previous AngloCanadian policy that had been followed since England's contact
with North American First Nations. The treaty-making process
that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 codified in prerogative law and
which Canada was founded on was ignored. Federal responsibility
to carry out the treaty-making process was abandoned. Premier
Smallwood accepted the Prime Minister's proposal on June 2, 1965.
Between 1949 and 1965, the Federal Government had avoided
declaring the Indian Act to be in effect in Newfoundland pursuant
to subsection 18(2) of the terms of union:
Statutes of the Parliament of Canada in force at the date
of Union, or any part thereof, shall come into force in the
Province of Newfoundland on a day or days to be fixed
by Act of Parliament or by proclamation of the
Governor-General in Council issued from time to
.
time
... 77

75 25 May 1965, Correspondence, Prime Minster Pearson to Premier
]. Smallwood.
76 Supra note 75 at 6.
77 A review of Appendix 12 of the Revised Statutes of Newfoundland include all
Proclamations of Federal laws in effect in Newfoundland by the Governor-General
in Council. The Indian Act is not listed in any of these proclamations. The statutory
provision that the laws of Canada are always speaking in the federal Interpretation
Act does not over come the constitutionally prescribed process of bringing federal
laws into effect in Newfoundland.
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This ensured that the existence of First Nations would be hidden
along with the Federal responsibility to enter into a treaty process
with the First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador.

VI. LIBERAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND GENERAL
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES

There are several underlying themes that are tenets of Liberal philosophy in the Federal and Newfoundland positions held between
1949 and 1964. The first is the federal position that Aboriginal
peoples should be assimilated as quickly as possible. This would end
federal expenditures for special services and move Indians onto
provincial services where they would be treated the same as the nonIndian population in the provinces where they resided. The assimilation of First Nations flows from the Liberal tenant that posits
formal equality.
The Federal decision to pretend that First Nations in
Newfoundland and Labrador had already been assimilated and
were "enfranchised" is inconsistent with the repeated federal wish to
have them eventually take their place as "fully participating citizens." The statements of federal officials and politicians demonstrate that First Nations peoples in Newfoundland-Labrador were
not considered fully assimilated. First Nations in Newfoundland
and Labrador, however, were given no choice between enfranchisement or entering into treaties and registering as Indians under the
Indian Act.
Providing First Nations with such a choice would have made it
possible for them to become informed of their rights under the
Royal Proclamation of 1763. Even though the Federal Memorandum
acknowledged that no treaties had been made in NewfoundlandLabrador, the standard step of treaty making that had been established by British and Canadian legal policy was not discussed. Had
the rule of law been complied with, the Federal Government would
have had to hold treaty discussions with First Nations. This would
have led to setting aside reserves and registering First Nations peoples in Newfoundland-Labrador under the Indian Act as the legal
review in the Memorandum for Cabinet highlighted. This was not
the action that federal civil servants and politicians wanted to undertake in Newfoundland-Labrador.
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Federal policy development with respect to Indian Affairs had
been searching for a way to implement a faster method of assimilating First Nations since 1950. The protection from assimilation
which the Indian Act and reserves provided were seen as creating "a
separateness that ... appears to operate, in the long term, to the
disadvantage of Indians." 78 The "disadvantage" appears to be that
they were not being assimilated into British culture.
To support the fiction that Indians in Newfoundland and
Labrador were already enfranchised, Federal officials pointed to the
fact that the old Colonial and Commission of Government had
never passed any laws with respect to Indians or Eskimos. Federal
officials claimed this meant that Aboriginal people were already
"enfranchised"-no longer Indian-the goal of the Indian Act.
Therefore, the Federal Government could claim, as Hon. Ellen
Fairclough did in her letter of 1962, that Aboriginal people in
Newfoundland and Labrador had been enfranchised since the first
day of confederation and that the Federal Government had no responsibility for them. However, as noted above, if this position was
truly believed, then it would have been illogical to give funds to
Newfoundland for the purpose of assimilating First Nations which
Federal officials had claimed were already assimilated.
The opportunity for First Nations peoples to be fully informed
of the Federal Government's legal obligations and then to exercise
individual choice as to the relationship they wished to have with
Canada was denied. The people of the First Nations in
Newfoundland and Labrador were denied a process similar to that
enjoyed by Anglo-immigrants in Newfoundland that was based on
respect for individual liberty, informed choice, and consent.
The Newfoundland Government's position was also based on a
tenant of Liberal philosophy. The Government of Newfoundland
claimed that it, and those it represented, was not being treated
"equally" with the other provinces of Canada. Newfoundlanders
were paying for services for Indians and Eskimos in Labrador that
the federal government was paying for everywhere else in Canada.
In essence, the Government of Newfoundland claimed, on behalf
of its constituents, that it was being "harmed." Newfoundland
wanted the Government of Canada to intervene, to take over the

78

Robertson to Laing, supra note 56.
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responsibility for Aboriginal people in Labrador or pay them to
administer Indian and Eskimo affairs.
If funded to administer Indian and Eskimo Affairs,
Newfoundland proposed that it would implement the policy of assimilation and formal equality which the Federal Government
wanted to implement in other areas of Canada. Newfoundland
stated it would not provide any special services for Aboriginal people. Instead Newfoundland would treat First Nations people
"precisely the same way as other inhabitants (Anglo-immigrants) of
the province."
In reality, what Newfoundland was attempting to obtain was a
double payment for Aboriginal people. Aboriginal peoples were already counted once as members of the general Newfoundland
population for purposes of transfer and other payments from the
Federal Government and, under this proposal, the Federal
Government would pay Newfoundland for them again as
Aboriginal peoples. However, special services, as the Federal
Government promised in 1947, would not be provided by the
provincial government. This was the liberal vision of individual development Newfoundland officials had for Aboriginal peoples. This
was their proposal that would satisfy their self-actualization as government officials in structuring Newfoundland society, and was
adopted as government policy.
Absent from all this discussion is any acknowledgment by either
level of government that Aboriginal peoples in Newfoundland had
any right to be informed or to freely determine what their living arrangements with the Anglo-immigrants might be. It was suggested
in the Federal Memorandum to Cabinet that this was done in western Canada, yet this precedent was not referred to in the recommendations drafted by policy makers.
Ironically, under the Indian Act, Mi'kmaq people in Nova
Scotia were not seen as having any individual Liberal-like rights to
freely determine their form of government unless they requested to
be enfranchised. In Newfoundland and Labrador, Aboriginal peoples whose identities as Aboriginal people had been legally oppressed so that they could be considered "enfranchised" were not
accorded the same right as Anglo-immigrants freely and voluntarily
to determine what their status would be, who would govern them,
and to which level of the Canadian government they would relate.
Thus, it appears that being considered "enfranchised" did not mean
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that First Nations people in Newfoundland-Labrador would be accorded Liberal democratic privileges. The right to pursue one's own
vision of happiness, to determine one's government through a process of informed voluntary consent, to be free of state interference,
and to expect protection of one's life, liberty and property from
individuals and the state, was not provided to First Nations in
Newfoundland and Labrador. Enfranchisement was used as an excuse to withhold the rights of First Nations peoples to negotiate
their own terms of a social contract with Canada and
Newfoundland.
The Cabinet Memorandum of 1965 demonstrates, I would
suggest, that the Innu and Inuit Nations of Labrador were still considered as "Indians and Eskimos." Federal officials did not believe
that these racial and cultural differences could be extinguished by
involuntary enfranchisement. For the Mi'kmaq people on the Island
of Newfoundland, the Government of Newfoundland had requested that the Federal Government ignore them entirely. The
Government of Newfoundland was not even prepared to take extra
Federal monies via the unconstitutional agreement of 1965 for the
Mi'kmaq. The Federal Government was remarkably willing to accommodate the unconstitutional wishes of the Newfoundland
Government without question, investigation, or consultation to determine what the wishes of the Mi'kmaq people on the Island of
Newfoundland might have been.
Foreign people with foreign values unilaterally applied their vision of the Liberal principles of the social contract to First Nations
in Newfoundland-Labrador, classifying them as "enfranchised."
The element of free voluntary choice and consent to
"enfranchisement" that the legal opinion in the Cabinet
Memorandum of April 1965 highlighted was ignored. In order to
relieve itself of its responsibility to enter into treaties and provide
special services and protection as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 directed, the Federal and Provincial Governments secretly withheld
information from First Nations in order to deny them the opportunity to exercise their Liberal individual rights in a "treaty commonwealth," an Aboriginal-Crown social contract.
Like the dispossession of Mi'kmaq properties in Nova Scotia,
the Federal and Newfoundland Anglo-immigrant Governments
dispossessed First Nations of their property and political rights in
Newfoundland and Labrador by asserting that they had voluntarily
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enfranchised themselves. This appears to have also been equated
with a voluntary cession of political and territorial rights. Thus, the
Federal Government could claim that First Nations had deIndianized themselves and their reserved lands. There were no
"Indians," and no "Lands reserved for Indians" that the Federal
Government had responsibility for in Newfoundland-Labrador.
Once again, Anglo-immigrants had acted so as to place their
own Liberal individual rights over those of First Nations people.
However, in Newfoundland and Labrador it was not accomplished
by overtly racist legal decisions. Rather, it was accomplished by the
Liberal theory of equality. The Liberal theory of equality put a kind
and benevolent face on this nineteenth century form of colonial
racism. It declared that First Nations people were formally "equal"
in citizenship rights. What this really amounted to was the negation
of First Nation's Aboriginal rights by making it appear that First
Nations had abandoned their political rights and territorial resources, permitting the immigrant governments to assume control
and possession over them. This form of assimilative equality meant
that First Nations people had gained nothing, but had lost their
identities and rights as Aboriginal peoples. This arbitrary characterization as enfranchised Indians was meant to make them legally unrecognizable at law as Aboriginal peoples ... or at least Canadian
and Newfoundland officials believe this would be the outcome of
any legal challenges to what they had "informally" agreed to do to
the Aboriginal nations in Newfoundland and Labrador.
The Canadian rule of law now includes a direction to the
Federal and Newfoundland Governments that existing aboriginal
and treaty rights must be recognized and affirmed by them as required by subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In R. v.
Sparrow, the Supreme Court held that the British Crown assumed
fiduciary obligations to protect First Nations peoples, their rights
and their lands when it proclaimed the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
These obligations were passed on to the Federal Government in
subsection 91 (24) of the Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982. In
summarizing the nature of these obligations, former Chief Justice
Dickson stated:
In our opinion, Guerin together with R. v. Taylor and
Williams (1981), O.R. (2d) 360, ground a general guiding principle for s. 35(1). That is the Government has the
responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to
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Aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the
Government and Aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation
of Aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this historic relationship.79

As noted earlier, Henderson believed the general principles of
common law could be applied to protect the rights and interests of
First Nations and their peoples. However, in the past courts were
bound by the command theory of law. If a statute abridged common law rights the courts felt compelled to apply the statute law in
the appropriate circumstances. Parliament and the legislatures were
supreme within their respective constitutional jurisdictions. In the
past, the courts were also caught up in the Canadian belief of their
cultural and racial superiority to Aboriginal peoples.
Now the courts are the guardians of the law as set out in the
Constitution Act, 1982 and should permit no laws to abrogate or
derogate from Aboriginal rights. If it can be shown that the
Governments have breached their fiduciary obligations to protect
Aboriginal peoples and their Aboriginal rights the courts can award
damages. Damages for breach of fiduciary obligations usually require that the beneficiaries be put in as good a position as they
should have been if no breach had occurred.
When the First Nations of Newfoundland and Labrador mount
a challenge to the actions of the Federal and Newfoundland
Governments the spotlight will be on the Newfoundland courts.
Will the deliberate breaches of Federal fiduciary obligations be
condoned or condemned? Will the ultra vires agreements be struck
down or upheld? Will the abrogation and derogation of the
Aboriginal and treaty rights of First Nations by the Federal and
Newfoundland Governments be held to be a contravention of subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982? Will the courts order
the Federal and Newfoundland Governments to provide
Newfoundland and Labrador First Nations with the opportunity to
exercise Liberal-like individual rights to determine what their terms
of union will be? Will the courts be prepared to order vast amounts
of compensation for the withholding of federal services that First
Nations peoples in Newfoundland-Labrador should have been re79 R. v. Sparrow (1990), 111 N.R. 241 (S.C.C.) at 276. See 271-76 for the full
development of the summa1y of this principle.
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ceiving since 1949? Will Henderson's dark theme of Canadian-First
Nations relations prevail again or will the courts rule against their
own governments, putting First Nations interests ahead of their
own? Three quarters of the territory of Newfoundland and
Labrador are claimed by First Nations. The past governments of
Newfoundland have never made an attempt to explicitly extinguish
First Nations Aboriginal or treaty rights. The clash of cultures will
ring loudly when the First Nations of Newfoundland-Labrador
challenge the illegal and dishonourable acts of the Federal and
Newfoundland Governments.
If the Federal and Newfoundland Governments can be persuaded or harassed into rectifying their past acts of colonial oppression a unique opportunity could materialize. The First Nations of
Newfoundland-Labrador could become a "pilot project" once again
in charting a new course for Canadian-First Nations relations.
Canada and Newfoundland could, for the first time in Canadian
colonial history, agree to negotiate a treaty of confederation with
Newfoundland and Labrador First Nations, recognizing their independent status as self-governing peoples.

